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Abstract
We derive some results on contrarian and one-sided strategies by Skeptic for
the fair-coin game in the framework of the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and
Vovk [8]. In particular, concerning the rate of convergence of the strong law of
large numbers (SLLN), we prove that Skeptic can force that the convergence has to
be slower than or equal to O(n−1/2). This is achieved by a very simple contrarian
strategy of Skeptic. This type of result, bounding the rate of convergence from
below, contrasts with more standard results of bounding the rate of SLLN from
above by using momentum strategies. We also derive a corresponding one-sided
result.
1 Introduction
In the theory of game-theoretic probability by Shafer and Vovk [8], various “probability
laws” such as SLLN are proved by constructing explicit strategies of Skeptic, who is one
of the two players in a game. Construction of a clever and explicit strategy of Skeptic
often leads to a remarkably simple proof of the corresponding result in the measure theo-
retic probability theory, even without preparations from measure theory. This is already
apparent in the simple strategy used in Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk [8], where Skeptic
always bets a fixed proportion of his capital. See also the Bayesian strategies of Skeptic
in coin-tossing games in [3]. New problems and their solutions offered by the frame-
work of the game-theoretic probability are now actively investigated in various directions.
For background material and further developments of the game-theoretic probability see
Vovk and Shafer [10] and Shafer and Vovk [9] and references therein. See Takeuchi [12]
for some original ideas and results. Defensive forecasting, which is a new non-parametric
forecasting method based on the game-theoretic probability, was initiated in [14] and [15].
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We can roughly classify strategies of Skeptic into two classes, namely the class of
momentum strategies and the class of contrarian strategies. This distinction was clearly
demonstrated in a talk by Glenn Shafer [7]. See also [13]. Consider again the convergence
in SLLN. In momentum strategies Skeptic assumes that Reality, the other player of the
game, will keep deviating from the (zero) theoretical mean in the same direction and
bets accordingly. In contrast, in contrarian strategies Skeptic assumes that Reality tries
to decrease deviation from the mean and bets accordingly. In both of these strategies,
Skeptic looks only at the absolute deviation and in this sense these strategies are two-
sided strategies. A more primitive strategy of Skeptic is one-sided and bets only toward a
particular direction (up or down). In Shafer and Vovk [8] one-sided strategies are treated
as restrictions on the move space of Skeptic, namely Skeptic is only allowed to buy a
certain “ticket”. However as we discuss in Section 3, Skeptic can use one-sided strategies
to force stronger unbiasedness to Reality than implied by two-sided strategies.
It is only natural to expect that stronger results require more complicated strategies
by Skeptic. For example in [2] we have shown that a simple strategy of Skeptic based on
the past average of the moves by Reality forces SLLN for the case of bounded Reality’s
moves. However if Reality’s moves are unbounded, strategies for forcing SLLN are much
more complicated as discussed in [4].
As another example, we mention that the proof of the law of the iterated logarithm
(LIL) in Chapter 5 of Shaver and Vovk [8] is much harder than the proof of SLLN or
the central limit theorem. There are two parts in the proof of LIL. In the first part the
growth rate of the capital process is bounded from above by a momentum strategy and
in the second part it is bounded from below by a contrarian strategy. As seen from the
proof, the latter part of the proof is much more difficult. This suggests that construc-
tion of effective contrarian strategies of Skeptic is more challenging than construction of
momentum strategies. In this paper we only consider the fair-coin game, which is the
simplest game in the game-theoretic probability. However we believe that the contrarian
strategies obtained in this paper can be generalized further and give insights on other
strategies in various more general games in the game-theoretic probability. We should
also mention that our results on the rate of convergence of SLLN are already implied by
LIL. Therefore the merit of this paper is to clarify implications of very simple explicit
contrarian strategies.
Organization of the paper is as follows. For the rest of this section, we briefly introduce
necessary notations and definitions from [8]. In Section 2 we consider contrarian strategies.
It is divided into two subsections. In subsection 2.1 multiplicative contrarian strategies
based on the past average of Reality’s moves are studied and in subsection 2.2 additive
contrarian strategies based on the past sum of Reality’s moves are studied. In Section
3 we study one-sided strategies to strengthen results obtained in Section 2. We end the
paper with some discussions in Section 4.
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1.1 Notations and definitions
Here we summarize necessary notations and definitions from [8] for our paper. We also
give a formal definition of stopping times.
In this paper we consider the fair-coin game. Its protocol is given as follows.
Fair-Coin Game
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {−1, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mnxn.
END FOR
A finite sequence t = x1x2 · · ·xn consisting of 1 and −1 is called a situation and the set
of all situations is denoted by Ω♦. The length of t = x1x2 · · ·xn is n. The initial situation,
which is the special situation of the length 0, is denoted by  ∈ Ω♦. If a situation t is
an initial segment of another situation t′, we say that t precedes t′ and t′ follows t. For a
situation t = x1x2 · · ·xn, we define −t := (−x1)(−x2) · · · (−xn). If we consider the infinite
binary tree describing the progress of the fair-coin game, a situation can be identified with
a node in the tree.
An infinite sequence ξ = x1x2 . . . consisting of 1 and −1 is called a path and the set
of all paths is denoted by Ω. An event E is a subset of Ω. For a path ξ, the situation
consisting of the first n terms of ξ is written as ξn. Given a path ξ and a situation t, if
there exists n such that ξn = t, we say that ξ goes through t. Given a situation t, we
define the cylinder set Ot ⊂ Ω by
Ot := {ξ | ξ goes through t}.
A process is a function Ω♦ → R and a variable is a function Ω→ R. Given a process
f , a variable fn is defined by
fn(ξ) := f(ξn). (1)
In this paper the symbols s and x are used for two special processes, the sum and the
average. They are defined by
s(x1x2 · · ·xn) := x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn,
x(x1x2 · · ·xn) := x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn
n
,
where s() = x() = 0. By (1), we also write s(x1x2 · · ·xn) = sn(ξ), x(x1x2 · · ·xn) =
xn(ξ).
The strategy P of Skeptic is a process. When P is a strategy of Skeptic, the capital
process of P (with zero initial capital) is denoted by KP and defined by
KP(x1x2 · · ·xn) := P()x1 + P(x1)x2 + · · ·+ P(x1x2 · · ·xn−1)xn
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and KP() := 0. The capital process of P is the total amount Skeptic earns when he
follows the strategy P. If Skeptic uses the strategy P with the initial capital a and
Reality chooses the path ξ, then the capital Skeptic holds at the end of the n-th round is
a+KPn (ξ). When ξ is fixed, we write simply sn, xn or KPn .
We say that Skeptic can weakly force an event E ⊂ Ω, if there exists a strategy P of
Skeptic such that
lim sup
n
KPn (ξ) =∞, ∀ξ 6∈ E, (2)
under the restriction of the “collateral duty”
KPn (ξ) ≥ −1, ∀ξ ∈ Ω, ∀n ≥ 0.
We say that Skeptic can force E if lim supn in (2) is replaced by limn. By Lemma 3.1
of [8], if Skeptic can weakly force E, then he can force E.
The upper price E[x] of a variable x is defined by
E[x] := inf{a | ∃P ∀ξ ∈ Ω : a +KPn (ξ) ≥ x(ξ) a.a.}, (3)
where a.a. (almost always) means “except for a finite number of n”. We can regard a
variable x as a ticket whose holder earns x(ξ) if Reality chooses ξ and E[x] is the infimum
of the initial capital with which Skeptic can superreplicate x. When a ≥ E[x], we say
that Skeptic can buy x for a. Given a situation t, the upper price of x on the situation t
is also defined and denoted by Et[x] (Chapter 1 of [8]).
Finally we give a formal definition of a stopping time. A stopping time is a variable
f : Ω→ {1, 2, . . .} ∪ {∞}, which satisfies
∀ξ, ξ′ ∈ Ω, ∀n ∈ N : (f(ξ) = n & ξn = ξ′n)⇒ f(ξ′) = n,
where N = {1, 2, . . . }. For a stopping time f and a path ξ, if f(ξ) < ∞, ξf(ξ) is the
situation where the value of f(ξ) is determined. We let [f ] denote the set of situations
where the value of f is determined:
[f ] := {t ∈ Ω♦ | ∃ξ : ξf(ξ) = t}. (4)
A stopping time f can be identified with [f ].
2 Contrarian strategies
In this section we consider forcing the following events:
E1 := {ξ | lim sup
n→∞
√
n|xn| ≥ 1}, (5)
E2 := {ξ | |sn| >
√
n− 1 i.o.}, (6)
where i.o. (infinitely often) means “for infinitely many n”. In Subsection 2.1 we prove
that Skeptic can force E1 by a mixture of multiplicative contrarian strategies based on the
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past average of Reality’s moves and in Subsection 2.2 we prove that Skeptic can force E2
by a mixture of additive contrarian strategies based on the past sum of Reality’s moves.
Since E2 ⊂ E1, forcing E2 is stronger than forcing E1. However the multiplicative strategy
in Subsection 2.1 is of interest, because it is a contrarian counterpart of the momentum
strategy studied in [2].
2.1 Multiplicative contrarian strategy
In this section we study the following multiplicative contrarian strategy Pc:
Pc : Mn = −cxn−1Kn−1,
where c is an arbitrary constant satisfying 0 < c ≤ 1
2
and the initial capital is K0 = a = 1.
The case of −1
2
≤ c < 0 was studied in [2]. Let
Q =
∑
i∈N
1
2i
P1/2i
denote an infinite mixture of the strategies Pc, c = 1/2i, i = 1, 2, . . . . Then the following
result holds.
Theorem 1 Skeptic can force E1 by Q.
The rest of this subsection is devoted to a proof of Theorem 1. Let
Ec1 :=
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣ lim sup
n→∞
(1 + 2c)
√
n|xn| ≥ 1
}
.
Then E1 can be represented as
E1 =
⋂
i∈N
E
1/2i
1 .
Thus, by Lemma 3.2 of [8], Theorem 1 is a consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Skeptic can force Ec1 with Pc.
In order to prove the lemma, we need to show that for any ξ ∈ Ω
• Skeptic’s capital Kn = 1 +KPcn never gets negative, and
• lim supn→∞(1 + 2c)
√
n|xn| < 1 ⇒ Kn →∞ (n→∞).
By definition for any ξ,
Kn = Kn−1 − cxn−1Kn−1xn
= Kn−1(1− cxn−1xn)
=
n∏
i=2
(1− cxi−1xi). (7)
In the expression (7) the index i starts from 2 because x0 = 0. Also for any i = 2, 3, . . . , n,
1− cxi−1xi > 0. Thus the first statement on the collateral duty is trivial.
We divide the proof of the second statement into four parts.
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Step 1 In step 1 and step 2, we fix an arbitrary path ξ = x1x2 · · · ∈ Ω. Since log(1+t) ≥
t− t2 whenever |t| ≤ 1
2
, from (7)
logKn =
n∑
i=2
log(1− cxi−1xi)
≥ −c
n∑
i=2
xi−1xi − c2
n∑
i=2
x2i−1x
2
i . (8)
We use the identity
n∑
i=2
xi−1xi =
1
2
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1x
2
i +
n
2
x2n −
1
2
(
x21 +
n∑
i=2
1
i− 1x
2
i
)
(9)
which is shown in [2] and easily follows from
sn−1xn =
1
2
(s2n − s2n−1 − x2n).
Substituting (9) into (8), we have
logKn ≥ −c
{
1
2
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1x
2
i +
n
2
x2n −
1
2
(
x21 +
n∑
i=2
1
i− 1x
2
i
)}
− c2
n∑
i=2
x2i−1x
2
i
= − c
2
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1x
2
i −
nc
2
x2n +
c
2
(
x21 +
n∑
i=2
1
i− 1x
2
i
)
− c2
n∑
i=2
x2i−1x
2
i . (10)
Now, x2i = 1 because xi ∈ {−1, 1} and
1 +
1
2
+ · · ·+ 1
n− 1 ≥ log n =
∫ n
1
1
x
dx.
Thus we have
(10) = − c
2
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1x
2
i −
nc
2
x2n +
c
2
(
1 +
n∑
i=2
1
i− 1
)
− c2
n∑
i=2
x2i−1
≥ − c
2
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1x
2
i −
nc
2
x2n +
c
2
(1 + log n)− c2
n∑
i=2
x2i−1
=
c
2
(1 + log n)−
(
c
2
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1x
2
i + c
2
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 +
nc
2
x2n
)
=
c
2
{
1 + log n−
(
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1x
2
i + 2c
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 + nx
2
n
)}
=
c
2
{
1 + log n
(
1−
∑n
i=2
i
i−1
x2i + 2c
∑n
i=2 x
2
i−1 + nx
2
n
log n
)}
. (11)
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By (11) we have shown that
ξ ∈ Fc ⇒ lim
n→∞
Kn =∞.
where
Fc =
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣∣ lim supn→∞
∑n
i=2
i
i−1
x2i + 2c
∑n
i=2 x
2
i−1 + nx
2
n
log n
< 1
}
. (12)
Step 2 Rewriting the numerator in (12), we have
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1x
2
i + 2c
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 + nx
2
n
= 2cx21 +
n−1∑
i=2
(
i
i− 1 + 2c
)
x2i +
n
n− 1x
2
n + nx
2
n
= 2c+
n−1∑
i=2
(
1 +
1
i− 1 + 2c
)
x2i +
(
1 +
1
n− 1 + n
)
x2n
≤ 2c+
n−1∑
i=2
(
1 +
1
i− 1 + 2c
)
x2i + nx
2
n +
(
1 +
1
n− 1
)
, (13)
where we used x21 = 1 and xn ≤ 1.
By (13) we can state that for any ǫ > 0 there exist N1(ǫ) and Aǫ such that for any
ξ ∈ Ω
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1x
2
i + 2c
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 + nx
2
n ≤ (1 + ǫ+ 2c)
n−1∑
i=N1(ǫ)
x2i + nx
2
n + Aǫ. (14)
Step 3 Now we consider the following event.
Fc,ǫ = {ξ | lim sup
n→∞
(1 + ǫ+ 2c)nx2n < 1},
where ǫ > 0 is fixed. We will show that Fc,ǫ ⊂ Fc. Fix any path ξ ∈ Fc.ǫ. Then there exist
α = αξ < 1 and N2 = N2(ξ) such that for any n ≥ N2
(1 + ǫ+ 2c)x2n ≤ α
1
n
.
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Therefore for n > N2
(1 + ǫ+ 2c)
n−1∑
i=N ′1(ξ)
x2i = (1 + ǫ+ 2c)
N2−1∑
i=N ′1(ξ)
x2i + (1 + ǫ+ 2c)
n−1∑
i=N2
x2i
≤ (1 + ǫ+ 2c)
N2−1∑
i=N ′1(ξ)
x2i + α
(
1
N2
+ · · ·+ 1
n− 1
)
≤ α log n+Bξ, (15)
where N ′1(ξ) = N1(ǫ(ξ)) and Bξ is a constant. Substituting (15) into (14), we have
n∑
i=2
i
i− 1x
2
i + 2c
n∑
i=2
x2i−1 + nx
2
n ≤ α log n+ nx2n + Cξ,
where Cξ = Aǫ(ξ) +Bξ. Thus
lim sup
n→∞
∑n
i=2
i
i−1
x2i + 2c
∑n
i=2 x
2
i−1 + nx
2
n
logn
≤ lim sup
n→∞
α log n+ nx2n + Cξ
log n
= α < 1,
where we used lim sup
n→∞
nxn
logn
= 0 since lim supn→∞(1 + ǫ+ 2c)nx
2
n < 1.
Step 4 By definition for any ξ ∈ Ω\Ec1 we have
lim sup
n→∞
(1 + 2c)nx2n < 1.
So we can find ǫ(ξ) such that
lim sup
n→∞
(1 + ǫ(ξ) + 2c)nx2n < 1.
Then Step 1 and Step 3 show Kn → ∞ (n → ∞) if Reality chooses ξ ∈ Ω\Ec1. This
completes the proof of Lemma 1.
2.2 Additive contrarian strategies
In this section we prove the following theorem which gives a somewhat stronger statement
than Theorem 1:
Theorem 2 Skeptic can weakly force E2.
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In order to prove this theorem we need to combine various strategies. The basic
ingredient is an additive contrarian strategy in (16) below. Other strategies will be studied
in separate subsections. Here is the general flow of the proof. First (section 2.2.1) we will
construct a strategy which makes the initial capital K0 = 1 increase to Kn = 1+ n2 ǫ when
sn = 0. Next (section 2.2.2), we will construct a strategy weakly forcing {sn = 0 i.o.}.
These strategies have a risk that the capital becomes negative if Reality makes |sn| as
large as
√
n. Therefore Skeptic must stop running the strategies right before his capital
becomes negative in order to observe the collateral duty. But if Reality keeps |sn| smaller
than
√
n forever, Skeptic can keep running strategies and then lim supKn = ∞. Thus
Skeptic can weakly force that |sn| becomes as large as
√
n eventually. Now dividing the
initial capital into countably many accounts, Skeptic can weakly force that |sn| become
as large as
√
n infinitely often.
2.2.1 The strategy increasing the capital when the sum process returns to
the origin
Here we consider the following additive contrarian strategy P˜ǫ:
P˜ǫ : Mn = −ǫsn−1, (16)
where ǫ > 0 is a small positive constant. If we temporarily ignore the collateral duty, the
strategy P˜ǫ has a very simple explicit capital process described in the next lemma.
Lemma 2
KP˜ǫn =
ǫ
2
(n− s2n). (17)
Proof: We use an induction on n. When n = 0, (17) holds by definition. Now assume
that (17) holds for n = k. There are five cases depending on the signs of xk+1 and sk.
1. sk = 0.
2. xk+1 = 1, sk > 0.
3. xk+1 = 1, sk < 0.
4. xk+1 = −1, sk > 0.
5. xk+1 = −1, sk < 0.
case 1) sk = 0 : By the assumption of induction,
KP˜ǫk =
ǫ
2
k.
Since sk = 0, s
2
k+1 = 1 and Mk+1 = 0. Thus we have
KP˜ǫk+1 = KP˜
ǫ
k +Mk+1xk+1
=
ǫ
2
k
=
ǫ
2
(k + 1− s2k+1).
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case 2) xk+1 = 1, sk > 0 : By the assumption of induction,
KP˜ǫk =
ǫ
2
(k − s2k).
Since Mk+1 = −ǫsk and s2k+1 = (sk + 1)2, we have
KP˜ǫk+1 = KP˜
ǫ
k +Mk+1xk+1
=
ǫ
2
(k − s2k)− ǫsk
=
ǫ
2
(k − s2k − 2sk)
=
ǫ
2
(k + 1− (s2k + 2sk + 1))
=
ǫ
2
(k + 1− (sk + 1)2)
=
ǫ
2
(k + 1− s2k+1).
The other cases are proved by almost the same argument.
We can intuitively understand the behavior of KP˜ǫn with Figure 1. In Figure 1, the
value beside a point denotes the value of KP˜ǫn at that situation and the value beside a
diagonal line indicates the payoff Skeptic obtains in the next round.
As seen in (17), however small ǫ is, 1+KP˜ǫn will be negative if Reality makes |sn| large
enough. Here we consider the way to avoid the bankruptcy. The condition for KP˜ǫn to be
greater or equal to −1 is
KP˜ǫn =
2
ǫ
(n− s2n) ≥ −1 ⇔ |sn| ≤
√
n +
2
ǫ
. (18)
Here, suppose that Skeptic follows P˜ǫ and is going to announce the n-th move Mn at the
n-th round. He can refer to sn−1 but not to sn. If
|sn−1| >
√
n+
2
ǫ
− 1,
then he should stop following Pǫ, or else Reality can make him bankrupt. We let Pǫ
denote the strategy that follows P˜ǫ under this stopping rule:
Pǫ :Mn =

 −ǫsn−1 if |si−1| ≤
√
i+
2
ǫ
− 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
0 otherwise.
Lemma 3 The strategy Pǫ weakly forces the following Eǫ3:
Eǫ3 :=
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃n : |sn| >
√
n+ 1 +
2
ǫ
− 1 or
(
lim sup
n→∞
|sn| =∞ & sn 6= 0 a.a.
)}
.
00
ǫ
−ǫ
ǫ
−3ǫ
2ǫ
0
−6ǫ
2ǫ
−2ǫ
−10ǫ
3ǫ
ǫ
−5ǫ
−15ǫ
0 +ǫ
−ǫ +2ǫ
−2ǫ
+ǫ
−ǫ
+3ǫ
−3ǫ
+2ǫ
−2ǫ
+4ǫ
−4ǫ
+ǫ
−ǫ
+3ǫ
−3ǫ
+5ǫ
−5ǫ
KP˜ǫ
n
−Mn+1
Mn+1
n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
sn
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Figure 1: Behavior of KP˜ǫn
Proof: Fix any path ξ /∈ Eǫ3. Then
|sn−1| ≤
√
n+
2
ǫ
− 1, ∀n
holds and the capital process KPǫn (ξ) is equal to KP˜ǫn (ξ). Furthermore at least one of the
following two cases holds:
1. There exists L such that |sn| < L, ∀n,
2. sn = 0 holds for infinitely many n.
case 1) Since s2n < L
2,
KPǫn =
ǫ
2
(n− s2n) >
ǫ
2
(n− L2)→∞ (n→∞).
case 2) When sn = 0,
KPǫn =
ǫ
2
n.
Therefore if sn = 0 occurs infinitely often, lim sup
n→∞
KPǫn =∞.
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Now we define E3 by
E3 :=
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣ |sn| > √n− 1 i.o. or
(
lim sup
n→∞
|sn| =∞ & sn 6= 0 a.a.
)}
.
Then ⋂
i∈N
E2
−i
3 ⊂ E3
and by Lemma 3.2 of [8] the next corollary holds.
Corollary 1 Skeptic can weakly force E3.
2.2.2 A strategy weakly forcing boundedness or two-sided unboundedness of
the sum process
Here we consider weakly forcing the following event
E4 :=
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣ lim sup
n→∞
|sn| <∞ or
(
lim sup
n→∞
sn =∞ & lim inf
n→∞
sn = −∞
)}
.
Actually in weakly forcing E4 we combine two one-sided strategies. Consider the following
very simple additive one-sided strategy:
P−N :Mn =


1
N
if min
1≤i≤n−1
si > −N,
0 otherwise.
(19)
P−N bets the constant amount 1/N until sn reaches −N for the first time. Similarly
define P+N by
P+N :Mn =

−
1
N
if max
1≤i≤n−1
si < N,
0 otherwise.
(20)
Corresponding to these strategies in the following lemma we consider two one-sided events.
Lemma 4 Let N be any positive number and define E−N4 , E
+N
4 as follows:
E−N4 :=
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣ mini=1,2,... si ≤ −N or lim supn→∞ sn <∞
}
,
E+N4 :=
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣ maxi=1,2,... si ≥ N or lim infn→∞ sn > −∞
}
.
Skeptic can weakly force E+N4 and E
−N
4 .
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Proof: Clearly the capital process KP−N of P−N is given by
KP−Nn =


sn
N
if min
1≤i≤n−1
si > −N,
−1 otherwise.
This shows that P−N weakly forces E−N4 . The proof for E+N4 is almost the same by using
P+N .
Corollary 2 Skeptic can weakly force E4.
Proof: Define E−4 and E
+
4 as follows:
E−4 :=
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣ lim infn→∞ sn = −∞ or lim supn→∞ sn <∞
}
,
E+4 :=
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣ lim infn→∞ sn > −∞ or lim supn→∞ sn =∞
}
.
Then we can write
E−4 =
⋂
N∈N
E−N4 ,
E+4 =
⋂
N∈N
EN4 ,
and
E4 = E
−
4 ∩ E+4 .
By the Lemma 3.2 of [8], the corollary holds.
2.2.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Using Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, now we can prove Theorem 2.
Proof: From Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, Skeptic can weakly force E3 ∩ E4. So we
only have to show E2 ⊃ E3 ∩ E4. Now we set
A1 :=
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣ lim sup
n→∞
|sn| =∞ & sn 6= 0 a.a.
}
,
A2 :=
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣ lim sup
n→∞
|sn| <∞
}
,
A3 :=
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣ lim sup
n→∞
sn =∞ & lim inf
n→∞
sn = −∞
}
.
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Then we can write
E3 = E2 ∪ A1, E4 = A2 ∪A3.
By definition
∅ = E2 ∩A2 = A1 ∩A2 = A1 ∩A3
and therefore
E3 ∩ E4 = E2 ∩A3 ⊂ E2.
This proof also shows the next theorem.
Theorem 3 Skeptic can weakly force A3.
3 One sided strategies
The statement of Theorem 2 is only concerned with the behavior of |sn| and Reality is
forced to make |sn| >
√
n − 1 infinitely often. But it says nothing about the sign of sn.
Hence Reality can choose a path such that sn >
√
n−1 infinitely often but sn < −
√
n+1
only finitely often. In this section we prove the following theorem which eliminates this
shortcoming.
Theorem 4 Skeptic can weakly force the following E5 and E6:
E5 := {ξ | sn >
√
n− 1 i.o.},
E6 := {ξ | sn < −
√
n+ 1 i.o.}.
The statement in Theorem 4 seems to be innocuous and one might expect that it can
be proved by the obvious symmetry of the fair-coin game. Actually we found it difficult
to prove Theorem 4 by combination of simple strategies. Recall that in the previous
section, except for combining countably many strategies, the individual strategies were
very simple and explicit. Furthermore it should be possible to generalize the results in the
previous section to more general protocols than the fair-coin game by introducing pricing
of quadratic hedges as in Chapter 4 of [8].
On the other hand, our proof of Theorem 4 uses the fact that in the fair-coin game
it is conceptually very easy to determine the price of every variable. Mathematically it
is the same as the pricing of options for binomial models, which is explained in standard
introductory textbooks on mathematical finance (e.g. [1]). See also [11] for a game-
theoretic exposition of the pricing formulas for the binomial model.
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3.1 Two stopping times
For i = 1, 2, . . . , we define stopping times wi and vi by
wi := min {n > vi−1 | sn = 0} ,
vi := min
{
n > wi
∣∣ |sn| > √n− 1} ,
where v0 := 0 and if the set in the definition is empty then the value of the variable is
∞. vi is the first hitting time of the two-sided
√
n-boundary after leaving the origin at
wi and wi is the first time of returning to the origin after vi−1. See Figure 2.
wivi−1
sn =
√
n
Figure 2: definition of wi and vi
Now for i = 1, 2, . . . , we define a variable Xi by
Xi :=
{
1 vi <∞ & svi < 0,
0 otherwise.
We can think of Xi as a ticket, which pays you one dollar if the sum process hits the
negative boundary −√n (rather than the positive boundary √n ) at time vi.
3.2 Proof of theorem 4
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4. It is conceptually very easy. The
essential point is the proof of Lemma 5 below. We begin by giving our proof other than
Lemma 5.
Remember that Reality is forced the event A3∩E2. Therefore we can assume that she
chooses ξ ∈ A3 ∩ E2. Therefore for proving Theorem 4, it suffices to prove that Skeptic
can weakly force A3 ∩ E2 ⇒ E5 (cf. Lemma 2.1 of [4]).
In Lemma 5, we prove Et[Xi] ≤ 12 for any situation t ∈ [wi] by constructing the
replicating strategy of Xi. We let PXi denote this strategy. Once PXi is constructed, the
strategy weakly forcing A3 ∩ E2 ⇒ E5 is given as follows:
• Buy 1
2
KXi when the present situation is in [wi] for i = 1, 2, . . .,
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where K denotes the present capital Skeptic possesses and buying 1
2
KXi actually means
running 1
2
KPXi .
Suppose Reality chooses the path ξ /∈ (A3 ∩ E2)C ∪ E5. Since ξ ∈ A3 ∩ E2, wi < ∞
and vi <∞ for any i. Thus Skeptic runs 12KwiPXi from the wi-th round for each i. After
the vi-th round, his capital becomes
3
2
Kwi if svi < 0 and 12Kwi if svi > 0. But svi < 0 for
all sufficiently large i since ξ /∈ E5, then Skeptic’s capital increases to ∞.
Now it remains to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For any i ∈ N and any t ∈ [wi]
Et[Xi] ≤ 1
2
. (21)
Proof: First we rephrase the lemma for simplicity. Fix any situation t ∈ [wi] and
suppose that the length of t is l. Define a stopping time ul and a variable Yl as
ul := min
{
n
∣∣∣ |sn| > √n+ l − 1} ,
Yl :=
{
1 if ul <∞ & sul < 0,
0 otherwise.
Considering the upper price of Xi at the situation t is equivalent to considering the upper
price of Yl at the situation , since s(t) = 0. Thus it suffices to show E[Yl] ≤ 12 for the
proof of Et[Xi] ≤ 12 .
The set {Yl = 1} can be decomposed as
{ξ | Yl(ξ) = 1} =
∞⋃
i=1
Ai,
Ai := {ξ | ul(ξ) = i, si < 0}.
Using Ai, Yl can be decomposed as
Yl =
∞∑
i=1
Zi, Zi(ξ) :=
{
1 if ξ ∈ Ai,
0 otherwise.
Whether ξ ∈ Ai or not depends solely on ξi, so Ai can be decomposed into the cylinder
sets defined by the situations of length i, that is, there exist tij (j = 1, 2, . . . , ai) such that
Ai =
ai⋃
j=1
Otij ,
where the length of tij is i (j = 1, 2, . . . , ai). We set,
tij = y
i,j
1 y
i,j
2 · · · yi,ji , (yi,jp ∈ {−1, 1}, p = 1, 2, . . . , i).
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Using tij , we define the strategy P i,j by
P i,j : Mn =
{
yi,jn Kn−1 for n = 1, 2, . . . , i,
0 for n > i,
where we temporarily suppose K0 = 2−i. Intuitively speaking, this strategy prepares the
amount of 2−i as the initial capital and bet all the available capital on the realization of
the situation tij . Hence, if t
i
j realizes, that is, xp = y
i,j
p , (p = 1, 2, . . . , i), then the capital
grows to 2i times, otherwise the capital becomes zero. Thus the capital process KPi,j
satisfies
2−i +KPi,ji (ξ) =
{
1 if ξ ∈ Otij ,
0 otherwise.
Moreover, we define the strategy P i by
P i :=
ai∑
j=1
P i,j.
The strategy P i requires the amount of ai2−i as the initial capital and its capital process
is written as
ai2
−i +KPii (ξ) =
{
1 if ξ ∈ ⋃aij=1Otij ,
0 otherwise.
Thus Skeptic can replicate Zi with the initial capital ai2
−i. Then, Skeptic can replicate
Yl =
∞∑
i=1
Zi with initial capital
∞∑
i=1
ai2
−i, so it suffices to show
∞∑
i=1
ai2
−i ≤ 1
2
.
for the proof of E[Yl] ≤ 12
Fix an arbitrary large number k. We consider the event Bk defined by
Bk := {ξ | ul(ξ) ≤ k, sl < 0}.
Whether ξ ∈ Bk or not depends solely on ξk, so Bk can be decomposed into the cylinder
sets:
Bk =
bk⋃
q=1
Ot′kq , (22)
where the length of t′kq is k (q = 1, 2, . . . , bk). Here we show bk ≤ 2k−1. First, remember
that there are just 2k situations of length k. If we define B−k as
B−k :=
bk⋃
q=1
O−t′kq ,
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then Bk ∩ B−k = ∅ by definition. Thus bk ≤ 12 · 2k = 2k−1. Furthermore Bk can be
decomposed also into Ai:
Bk =
k⋃
i=1
Ai =
k⋃
i=1
ai⋃
j=1
Otij .
Just 2k−i situations of {t′kq }bkq=1 follow tij , so the cylinder set Otij can be decomposed
into 2k−i cylinder sets:
Otij =
2k−i⋃
h=1
Ot′k
c[i,j,h]
,
where 1 ≤ c[i, j, h] ≤ bk and c[i, j, h] 6= c[i′, j′, h′] if (i, j, h) 6= (i′, j′, h′). Thus,
Bk =
k⋃
i=1
ai⋃
j=1
2k−i⋃
h=1
Ot′k
c[i,j,h]
. (23)
By (22) and (23)
bk =
k∑
i=1
ai2
k−i.
Since bk ≤ 2k−1,
k∑
i=1
ai2
k−i ≤ 2k−1 ⇒
k∑
i=1
ai2
−i ≤ 1
2
⇒
∞∑
i=1
ai2
−i ≤ 1
2
.
Lastly, we show that the inequality in the (21) is in fact an equality. Here we decompose
Ω into three subsets,
Di1 := {ξ | vi <∞ & svi < 0},
Di2 := {ξ | vi =∞},
Di3 := {ξ | vi <∞ & svi > 0}.
Then Xi = 1Di1 , where 1Di1 is the indicator function of D
i
1. By the definition of the upper
price,
1 = Et[1] ≤ Et[1Di1 ] + Et[1Di2] + Et[1Di3] (24)
By symmetry property,
Et[1Di1 ] = Et[1Di1]. (25)
Since Skeptic can force vi <∞ we have
Et[1Di2 ] = 0. (26)
Equations (24), (25) and (26) shows Et[1Di1] ≥ 12 , thus Et[1Di1 ] = Et[Xi] = 12 .
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4 Some discussions
In this paper we showed that Skeptic can (weakly) force E1, E2, E5 and E6 in the fair-coin
game. As mentioned in Section 1 these statements are weaker than LIL, which is shown
in [8] in the game-theoretic framework. But we want to emphasize the simplicity of our
strategies. Actually, Skeptic needs only to keep the value of sn in memory in the strategies
forcing E1 and E2.
In the proof of Lemma 5, we only proved the existence of the replicating strategy
of Yl rather than providing an explicit formula for bet (the move Mn of Skeptic) of the
strategy. The bet of the replicating strategy is directly related with the price of Yl at
an arbitrary situation by the argument of “delta hedge”[11]. Let η(n, s) denote the price
of Yl given the round n and the value of process s. Here let us consider the problem in
the measure-theoretic framework rather than the game-theoretic framework. Then η(n, s)
can be written as the measure-theoretic conditional expectation:
η(n, s) = E[Yl | sn = s]. (27)
Given η(n, s), the bet of replicating strategy by delta hedge is calculated as follows([11]):
Mn =
η(n + 1, s+ 1)− η(n+ 1, s− 1)
2
.
But in practice it would be difficult to express η(n, s) analytically. For the case of Brow-
nian motion [6] gives results on (27). However they are very complicated involving zeros
of a special function.
In order to prove the existence of the replicating strategy, we used the argument of
betting on specific paths. This type of argument can be found in the field of algorithmic
theory of randomness, for instance Muchnik et al. uses the same idea in [5, Theorem 9.4].
We think that the idea is logically very powerful because it can be used to prove the
existence of a superreplicating strategy for any ticket in the fair-coin game.
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